Files
halobestie-clone/backend/src/routes/public/shared.chat.routes.js
ramadhan sjamsani f860ab6c85 Phase 3.4: backend self-managed auth cutover
All backend auth now goes through our own token service — Firebase Auth
dependency is fully removed from auth paths. FCM (firebase-admin messaging)
is still used for push.

Schema:
- auth_sessions (multi-device refresh tokens, bcrypt-hashed)
- otp_requests (Fazpass reference + rate-limit history)
- customers.email + google_sub + apple_sub (social identity)
- control_center_users.password_hash + failed_login_count + lockout_until
- firebase_uid columns made nullable (drop in later cleanup migration)
- 6 new app_config keys for OTP + CC lockout tuning

Services:
- password.service.js — bcrypt cost 12 + complexity (min 8, digit + upper +
  lower)
- token.service.js — JWT HS256 access (1h) + opaque refresh (30d, bcrypt-
  hashed, rotated on use); session_id claim pre-wires future Valkey-based
  instant revocation; revokeSession + revokeAllSessionsForUser helpers
- social-identity.service.js — Google via google-auth-library, Apple via
  jwks-rsa + jsonwebtoken
- otp.service.js — Fazpass stub (generates locally, logs the code) clearly
  marked for replacement once real API docs arrive; rate-limit + resend
  cooldown + verify-attempts all configurable via app_config
- auth.service.js — orchestrator: signInAnonymous, completeCustomer/Mitra-
  PhoneSignIn, signInWithGoogle, signInWithApple, signInCcUser, refresh,
  logout; reject-on-existing for identity conflicts
- cc-user.service.js — email+password helpers + lockout counters

Routes & middleware:
- authenticate middleware now verifies our JWT and attaches
  request.auth = { userType, userId, sessionId }
- WebSocket handshake verifies our JWT (no more Firebase lookup)
- All existing routes updated to use request.auth.userId instead of
  request.firebaseUser.uid
- New public routes:
    /api/shared/auth/anonymous /refresh /logout
    /api/client/auth/otp/request /otp/verify /google /apple /me /profile
    /api/mitra/auth/otp/request /otp/verify /me
- New internal routes:
    /internal/auth/login /refresh /logout /me (httpOnly cookie refresh)
    /internal/control-center-users (accepts plain password, bcrypt-hashed)
    /internal/control-center-users/me/password (self-service change)
    /internal/control-center-users/:id/password (admin forced reset)
- Deleted legacy customer.routes.js (anonymous + link handled by auth now)
- app.internal.js: @fastify/cookie + CORS credentials for CC httpOnly cookie

Config:
- AUTH_JWT_SECRET + ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS + REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_DAYS env
- FAZPASS_* env vars (TBD until real API docs)
- GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDS, APPLE_SERVICES_ID/TEAM_ID/KEY_ID/PRIVATE_KEY
- ADMIN_EMAIL + ADMIN_PASSWORD for seed
- CC_ORIGIN for internal-app CORS origin allowlist

Dependencies:
- Added: bcrypt, jsonwebtoken, jwks-rsa, google-auth-library, @fastify/cookie
- Kept: firebase-admin (messaging only)

Still outstanding: Fazpass API integration (stub in place), Apple Developer
prereqs for end-to-end iOS testing, client_app/mitra_app/control_center auth
flow rewrites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-24 11:43:25 +08:00

122 lines
4.9 KiB
JavaScript

import { authenticate } from '../../plugins/auth.js'
import { getMessages } from '../../services/chat.service.js'
import { getSessionClosures } from '../../services/closure.service.js'
import { registerDeviceToken } from '../../services/notification.service.js'
import { flipSessionSensitivity } from '../../services/sensitivity.service.js'
import { getDb } from '../../db/client.js'
import { TopicSensitivity, UserType } from '../../constants.js'
const sql = getDb()
const resolveUser = async (request, reply) => {
if (request.auth?.userType !== UserType.CUSTOMER && request.auth?.userType !== UserType.MITRA) {
return reply.code(403).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Customer or mitra account required' },
})
}
request.userType = request.auth.userType
request.userId = request.auth.userId
}
// Verify session belongs to the authenticated user
const verifySessionOwnership = async (request, reply) => {
const { sessionId } = request.params
const [session] = await sql`
SELECT id FROM chat_sessions
WHERE id = ${sessionId}
AND (customer_id = ${request.userId} OR mitra_id = ${request.userId})
`
if (!session) {
return reply.code(403).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'You do not have access to this session' },
})
}
}
export const sharedChatRoutes = async (app) => {
// Get messages for a session (paginated)
app.get('/chat/:sessionId/messages', { preHandler: [authenticate, resolveUser, verifySessionOwnership] }, async (request, reply) => {
const { sessionId } = request.params
const { limit, before } = request.query
const messages = await getMessages(sessionId, {
limit: limit ? parseInt(limit) : 50,
before,
})
return reply.send({ success: true, data: messages })
})
// Get session info
app.get('/chat/:sessionId/info', { preHandler: [authenticate, resolveUser, verifySessionOwnership] }, async (request, reply) => {
const { sessionId } = request.params
const { getSessionById } = await import('../../services/session.service.js')
const session = await getSessionById(sessionId)
if (!session) {
return reply.code(404).send({ success: false, error: { code: 'NOT_FOUND', message: 'Session not found' } })
}
return reply.send({ success: true, data: session })
})
// Get full transcript (read-only, for history)
app.get('/chat/:sessionId/transcript', { preHandler: [authenticate, resolveUser, verifySessionOwnership] }, async (request, reply) => {
const { sessionId } = request.params
const messages = await getMessages(sessionId, { limit: 10000 })
const closures = await getSessionClosures(sessionId)
return reply.send({ success: true, data: { messages, closures } })
})
// Register FCM device token
app.post('/device-token', { preHandler: [authenticate, resolveUser] }, async (request, reply) => {
const { token } = request.body
if (!token) {
return reply.code(400).send({ success: false, error: { code: 'BAD_REQUEST', message: 'Token is required' } })
}
await registerDeviceToken(request.userType, request.userId, token)
return reply.send({ success: true })
})
// Submit goodbye/closure message
app.post('/sessions/:sessionId/close-message', { preHandler: [authenticate, resolveUser, verifySessionOwnership] }, async (request, reply) => {
const { sessionId } = request.params
const { message } = request.body
if (!message) {
return reply.code(400).send({ success: false, error: { code: 'BAD_REQUEST', message: 'Message is required' } })
}
const { submitClosureMessage } = await import('../../services/closure.service.js')
const closure = await submitClosureMessage(sessionId, request.userType, request.userId, message)
return reply.send({ success: true, data: closure })
})
// Mitra flips session topic sensitivity (regular <-> sensitive)
app.patch('/chat/sessions/:sessionId/topic', { preHandler: [authenticate, resolveUser] }, async (request, reply) => {
if (request.userType !== UserType.MITRA) {
return reply.code(403).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Only mitra can change topic sensitivity' },
})
}
const { sessionId } = request.params
const { topic_sensitivity } = request.body || {}
if (topic_sensitivity !== TopicSensitivity.REGULAR && topic_sensitivity !== TopicSensitivity.SENSITIVE) {
return reply.code(400).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'BAD_REQUEST', message: 'topic_sensitivity must be regular or sensitive' },
})
}
try {
const result = await flipSessionSensitivity({
sessionId,
mitraId: request.userId,
toValue: topic_sensitivity,
})
return reply.send({ success: true, data: result })
} catch (err) {
return reply.code(err.statusCode || 500).send({
success: false,
error: { code: err.code || 'INTERNAL', message: err.message },
})
}
})
}