- Test-OTP bypass allowlist for Apple reviewers / QA: phone-scoped static OTPs
managed in CC (Settings → Test OTP Bypass), bcrypt-hashed on save, kill-switch
toggle, per-entry expires_at. New `otp_requests` columns (is_bypass, code_hash)
+ DB CHECK enforcing bypass-row shape.
- Hash-at-rest for stub OTPs: replaced plaintext `<ref>:<code>` storage with
bcrypt(code_hash); reference goes to fazpass_reference alone. Verify routes on
sovereign is_bypass flag, defers code_hash-NULL rows to Fazpass.
- Fazpass integration (gated by FAZPASS_ENABLED env, default off): new
fazpass.service.js calling /v1/otp/{request,verify}; distinct errors for wrong
OTP (CODE_MISMATCH 401) vs provider outage (OTP_PROVIDER_FAILED 502).
- Removed redundant Free Trial CC section (was a back-compat shim for the same
pricing_promotions row as "Diskon Sesi Pertama") + unused alias in
pricing.service.js.
208 tests green (34 new for OTP + Fazpass). Fazpass API + dashboard PDFs added
at project root for reference (docs are auth-gated).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
215 lines
7.3 KiB
JavaScript
215 lines
7.3 KiB
JavaScript
import { authenticate } from '../../plugins/auth.js'
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import {
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getCustomerById,
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markCustomerUspSeen,
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updateCustomerDisplayName,
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} from '../../services/customer.service.js'
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import {
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completeCustomerPhoneSignIn,
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signInWithGoogle,
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signInWithApple,
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} from '../../services/auth.service.js'
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import { requestOtp, verifyOtp } from '../../services/otp.service.js'
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import { verifyAccessToken } from '../../services/token.service.js'
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import { UserType } from '../../constants.js'
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const extractDeviceInfo = (request) => ({
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user_agent: request.headers['user-agent'] || null,
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ip: request.ip || null,
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})
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// Phase 4 §2.1 — Resolve the trusted anonymous customer id for the merge path.
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// Source of truth is a verified Bearer JWT. The body field was deliberately
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// dropped: a tamper-able UUID in the body lets anyone who learns a victim's
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// anon id stamp `account_belongs_to` on it, which would mis-route their
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// transactions during reconciliation. The JWT is HS256-signed with
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// AUTH_JWT_SECRET — un-forgeable.
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//
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// Rules:
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// - Bearer valid + customer + customer.is_anonymous → return that customer id.
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// - Bearer valid + customer but NOT anonymous (already verified) → null
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// - Bearer absent or invalid → null
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const resolveAnonymousCustomerId = async ({ bearer }) => {
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if (!bearer || !bearer.startsWith('Bearer ')) return null
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try {
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const claims = verifyAccessToken(bearer.slice('Bearer '.length))
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if (claims.userType !== UserType.CUSTOMER) return null
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const customer = await getCustomerById(claims.userId)
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return customer?.is_anonymous ? customer.id : null
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} catch {
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return null
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}
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}
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const sendAuthError = (reply, err) => {
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if (!err.statusCode) reply.request.log.error({ err }, 'Unhandled auth error')
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return reply.code(err.statusCode || 500).send({
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success: false,
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error: {
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code: err.code || 'INTERNAL',
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message: err.message,
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...(err.details && { details: err.details }),
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},
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})
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}
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export const clientAuthRoutes = async (app) => {
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// --- Phone OTP ---
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app.post('/otp/request', async (request, reply) => {
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const { phone, channel } = request.body || {}
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try {
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const result = await requestOtp({
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phone,
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userType: UserType.CUSTOMER,
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ipAddress: request.ip,
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channel,
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logger: request.log,
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})
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return reply.send({ success: true, data: result })
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} catch (err) {
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return sendAuthError(reply, err)
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}
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})
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app.post('/otp/verify', async (request, reply) => {
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const { otp_request_id, code } = request.body || {}
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try {
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const { phone, user_type } = await verifyOtp({ otpRequestId: otp_request_id, code, logger: request.log })
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if (user_type !== UserType.CUSTOMER) {
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return reply.code(400).send({
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success: false,
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error: { code: 'WRONG_FLOW', message: 'This OTP was issued for a different user type' },
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})
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}
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// Phase 4 §2.1 — the anon prefix used to drive the
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// account_belongs_to merge is derived ONLY from the verified Bearer
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// JWT. Clients that need the merge must send their anonymous session's
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// access_token as `Authorization: Bearer …`. The body field is no
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// longer accepted.
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const anonymousCustomerId = await resolveAnonymousCustomerId({
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bearer: request.headers.authorization,
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})
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const { tokens, profile } = await completeCustomerPhoneSignIn({
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phone,
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anonymousCustomerId,
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deviceInfo: extractDeviceInfo(request),
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})
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return reply.send({ success: true, data: { ...tokens, profile } })
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} catch (err) {
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return sendAuthError(reply, err)
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}
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})
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// --- Google ---
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app.post('/google', async (request, reply) => {
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const { id_token } = request.body || {}
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if (!id_token) {
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return reply.code(422).send({
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success: false,
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error: { code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR', message: 'id_token is required' },
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})
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}
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try {
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// Phase 4 §2.1 — anon prefix is derived ONLY from the Bearer JWT;
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// body field `anonymous_customer_id` is not accepted.
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const anonymousCustomerId = await resolveAnonymousCustomerId({
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bearer: request.headers.authorization,
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})
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const { tokens, profile } = await signInWithGoogle({
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idToken: id_token,
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anonymousCustomerId,
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deviceInfo: extractDeviceInfo(request),
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})
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return reply.send({ success: true, data: { ...tokens, profile } })
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} catch (err) {
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return sendAuthError(reply, err)
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}
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})
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// --- Apple ---
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app.post('/apple', async (request, reply) => {
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const { id_token } = request.body || {}
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if (!id_token) {
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return reply.code(422).send({
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success: false,
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error: { code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR', message: 'id_token is required' },
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})
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}
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try {
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// Phase 4 §2.1 — same Bearer-only contract as /otp/verify and /google.
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const anonymousCustomerId = await resolveAnonymousCustomerId({
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bearer: request.headers.authorization,
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})
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const { tokens, profile } = await signInWithApple({
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idToken: id_token,
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anonymousCustomerId,
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deviceInfo: extractDeviceInfo(request),
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})
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return reply.send({ success: true, data: { ...tokens, profile } })
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} catch (err) {
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return sendAuthError(reply, err)
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}
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})
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// --- Current user profile ---
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app.get('/me', { preHandler: authenticate }, async (request, reply) => {
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if (request.auth.userType !== UserType.CUSTOMER) {
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return reply.code(403).send({
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success: false,
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error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Customer account required' },
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})
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}
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const customer = await getCustomerById(request.auth.userId)
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if (!customer) {
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return reply.code(404).send({
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success: false,
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error: { code: 'NOT_FOUND', message: 'Customer account not found' },
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})
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}
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return reply.send({ success: true, data: customer })
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})
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// --- Phase 4: mark USP screen as seen (one-time gate, idempotent) ---
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app.post('/usp-seen', { preHandler: authenticate }, async (request, reply) => {
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if (request.auth.userType !== UserType.CUSTOMER) {
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return reply.code(403).send({
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success: false,
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error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Customer account required' },
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})
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}
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const updated = await markCustomerUspSeen(request.auth.userId)
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if (!updated) {
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return reply.code(404).send({
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success: false,
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error: { code: 'NOT_FOUND', message: 'Customer account not found' },
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})
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}
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return reply.send({ success: true, data: updated })
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})
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// --- Update display name ---
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app.patch('/profile', { preHandler: authenticate }, async (request, reply) => {
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if (request.auth.userType !== UserType.CUSTOMER) {
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return reply.code(403).send({
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success: false,
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error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Customer account required' },
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})
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}
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const { display_name } = request.body || {}
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if (!display_name || typeof display_name !== 'string' || display_name.trim().length === 0) {
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return reply.code(422).send({
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success: false,
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error: { code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR', message: 'display_name is required' },
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})
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}
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const updated = await updateCustomerDisplayName(request.auth.userId, display_name.trim())
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return reply.send({ success: true, data: updated })
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})
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}
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