Files
halobestie-clone/backend/src/routes/public/client.auth.routes.js
Ramadhan Sjamsani 6fd98ca99c OTP overhaul: test-user bypass + hash-at-rest + Fazpass integration
- Test-OTP bypass allowlist for Apple reviewers / QA: phone-scoped static OTPs
  managed in CC (Settings → Test OTP Bypass), bcrypt-hashed on save, kill-switch
  toggle, per-entry expires_at. New `otp_requests` columns (is_bypass, code_hash)
  + DB CHECK enforcing bypass-row shape.
- Hash-at-rest for stub OTPs: replaced plaintext `<ref>:<code>` storage with
  bcrypt(code_hash); reference goes to fazpass_reference alone. Verify routes on
  sovereign is_bypass flag, defers code_hash-NULL rows to Fazpass.
- Fazpass integration (gated by FAZPASS_ENABLED env, default off): new
  fazpass.service.js calling /v1/otp/{request,verify}; distinct errors for wrong
  OTP (CODE_MISMATCH 401) vs provider outage (OTP_PROVIDER_FAILED 502).
- Removed redundant Free Trial CC section (was a back-compat shim for the same
  pricing_promotions row as "Diskon Sesi Pertama") + unused alias in
  pricing.service.js.

208 tests green (34 new for OTP + Fazpass). Fazpass API + dashboard PDFs added
at project root for reference (docs are auth-gated).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-29 22:39:34 +08:00

215 lines
7.3 KiB
JavaScript

import { authenticate } from '../../plugins/auth.js'
import {
getCustomerById,
markCustomerUspSeen,
updateCustomerDisplayName,
} from '../../services/customer.service.js'
import {
completeCustomerPhoneSignIn,
signInWithGoogle,
signInWithApple,
} from '../../services/auth.service.js'
import { requestOtp, verifyOtp } from '../../services/otp.service.js'
import { verifyAccessToken } from '../../services/token.service.js'
import { UserType } from '../../constants.js'
const extractDeviceInfo = (request) => ({
user_agent: request.headers['user-agent'] || null,
ip: request.ip || null,
})
// Phase 4 §2.1 — Resolve the trusted anonymous customer id for the merge path.
// Source of truth is a verified Bearer JWT. The body field was deliberately
// dropped: a tamper-able UUID in the body lets anyone who learns a victim's
// anon id stamp `account_belongs_to` on it, which would mis-route their
// transactions during reconciliation. The JWT is HS256-signed with
// AUTH_JWT_SECRET — un-forgeable.
//
// Rules:
// - Bearer valid + customer + customer.is_anonymous → return that customer id.
// - Bearer valid + customer but NOT anonymous (already verified) → null
// - Bearer absent or invalid → null
const resolveAnonymousCustomerId = async ({ bearer }) => {
if (!bearer || !bearer.startsWith('Bearer ')) return null
try {
const claims = verifyAccessToken(bearer.slice('Bearer '.length))
if (claims.userType !== UserType.CUSTOMER) return null
const customer = await getCustomerById(claims.userId)
return customer?.is_anonymous ? customer.id : null
} catch {
return null
}
}
const sendAuthError = (reply, err) => {
if (!err.statusCode) reply.request.log.error({ err }, 'Unhandled auth error')
return reply.code(err.statusCode || 500).send({
success: false,
error: {
code: err.code || 'INTERNAL',
message: err.message,
...(err.details && { details: err.details }),
},
})
}
export const clientAuthRoutes = async (app) => {
// --- Phone OTP ---
app.post('/otp/request', async (request, reply) => {
const { phone, channel } = request.body || {}
try {
const result = await requestOtp({
phone,
userType: UserType.CUSTOMER,
ipAddress: request.ip,
channel,
logger: request.log,
})
return reply.send({ success: true, data: result })
} catch (err) {
return sendAuthError(reply, err)
}
})
app.post('/otp/verify', async (request, reply) => {
const { otp_request_id, code } = request.body || {}
try {
const { phone, user_type } = await verifyOtp({ otpRequestId: otp_request_id, code, logger: request.log })
if (user_type !== UserType.CUSTOMER) {
return reply.code(400).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'WRONG_FLOW', message: 'This OTP was issued for a different user type' },
})
}
// Phase 4 §2.1 — the anon prefix used to drive the
// account_belongs_to merge is derived ONLY from the verified Bearer
// JWT. Clients that need the merge must send their anonymous session's
// access_token as `Authorization: Bearer …`. The body field is no
// longer accepted.
const anonymousCustomerId = await resolveAnonymousCustomerId({
bearer: request.headers.authorization,
})
const { tokens, profile } = await completeCustomerPhoneSignIn({
phone,
anonymousCustomerId,
deviceInfo: extractDeviceInfo(request),
})
return reply.send({ success: true, data: { ...tokens, profile } })
} catch (err) {
return sendAuthError(reply, err)
}
})
// --- Google ---
app.post('/google', async (request, reply) => {
const { id_token } = request.body || {}
if (!id_token) {
return reply.code(422).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR', message: 'id_token is required' },
})
}
try {
// Phase 4 §2.1 — anon prefix is derived ONLY from the Bearer JWT;
// body field `anonymous_customer_id` is not accepted.
const anonymousCustomerId = await resolveAnonymousCustomerId({
bearer: request.headers.authorization,
})
const { tokens, profile } = await signInWithGoogle({
idToken: id_token,
anonymousCustomerId,
deviceInfo: extractDeviceInfo(request),
})
return reply.send({ success: true, data: { ...tokens, profile } })
} catch (err) {
return sendAuthError(reply, err)
}
})
// --- Apple ---
app.post('/apple', async (request, reply) => {
const { id_token } = request.body || {}
if (!id_token) {
return reply.code(422).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR', message: 'id_token is required' },
})
}
try {
// Phase 4 §2.1 — same Bearer-only contract as /otp/verify and /google.
const anonymousCustomerId = await resolveAnonymousCustomerId({
bearer: request.headers.authorization,
})
const { tokens, profile } = await signInWithApple({
idToken: id_token,
anonymousCustomerId,
deviceInfo: extractDeviceInfo(request),
})
return reply.send({ success: true, data: { ...tokens, profile } })
} catch (err) {
return sendAuthError(reply, err)
}
})
// --- Current user profile ---
app.get('/me', { preHandler: authenticate }, async (request, reply) => {
if (request.auth.userType !== UserType.CUSTOMER) {
return reply.code(403).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Customer account required' },
})
}
const customer = await getCustomerById(request.auth.userId)
if (!customer) {
return reply.code(404).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'NOT_FOUND', message: 'Customer account not found' },
})
}
return reply.send({ success: true, data: customer })
})
// --- Phase 4: mark USP screen as seen (one-time gate, idempotent) ---
app.post('/usp-seen', { preHandler: authenticate }, async (request, reply) => {
if (request.auth.userType !== UserType.CUSTOMER) {
return reply.code(403).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Customer account required' },
})
}
const updated = await markCustomerUspSeen(request.auth.userId)
if (!updated) {
return reply.code(404).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'NOT_FOUND', message: 'Customer account not found' },
})
}
return reply.send({ success: true, data: updated })
})
// --- Update display name ---
app.patch('/profile', { preHandler: authenticate }, async (request, reply) => {
if (request.auth.userType !== UserType.CUSTOMER) {
return reply.code(403).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'FORBIDDEN', message: 'Customer account required' },
})
}
const { display_name } = request.body || {}
if (!display_name || typeof display_name !== 'string' || display_name.trim().length === 0) {
return reply.code(422).send({
success: false,
error: { code: 'VALIDATION_ERROR', message: 'display_name is required' },
})
}
const updated = await updateCustomerDisplayName(request.auth.userId, display_name.trim())
return reply.send({ success: true, data: updated })
})
}