Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
a48f108fc0 Phase 4 §2.1: anonymous → existing-user merge breadcrumb
Adds `customers.account_belongs_to UUID NULL` and refactors customer
sign-in (phone/Google/Apple) so an anon row that re-verifies into an
existing customer no longer 409s. Instead the anon row stays intact
with a breadcrumb pointing at the real customer; tokens are issued
for the existing user. Actual data reconciliation onto the existing
row (chat_sessions, customer_transactions, payment_sessions,
pairing_failures) is deferred.

Backend
- migrate.js: ADD COLUMN account_belongs_to UUID REFERENCES customers(id)
  ON DELETE SET NULL.
- customer.service.js: stampAccountBelongsTo helper; account_belongs_to
  exposed in CUSTOMER_SELECT.
- auth.service.js: new shared resolveCustomerForIdentity (4-case logic);
  normalizeIdentityConflict + IDENTITY_ALREADY_LINKED 409 deleted;
  completeCustomerPhoneSignIn / signInWithGoogle / signInWithApple all
  route through the shared helper.
- client.auth.routes.js: new resolveAnonymousCustomerId picks the anon
  prefix ONLY from a verified Bearer JWT — closes the UUID-leak attack
  where a tamper-able body field could mis-route someone else's
  transactions. /otp/verify, /google, /apple all use it; the body field
  `anonymous_customer_id` is no longer accepted on any of them.
- test/services/auth.service.test.js: 9 Vitest cases covering phone +
  Google + Apple, all 4 logic cases + multi-merge accumulation.

Customer app
- auth_notifier.dart::verifyOtp: drop `skipAuth: true` and the dead
  body field so ApiClient auto-attaches the anon's Bearer from
  AuthBridge. Survives the AuthOtpSentData state transition (the
  earlier `_currentAnonymousCustomerId()` state-drop bug is bypassed by
  sourcing the id from the bridge instead of state).
- Google + Apple client paths remain unchanged (gated on provider
  creds; mirror this fix when wiring lands).

Docs
- flow_customer.mermaid.md: new §2.1 sub-section with the merge
  diagram, schema note, replaces-current-behaviour paragraph, and
  Bearer-only security callout.
- phase3.4-testing.md: §1.5 line 76 simplified (no more per-path
  split); new §1.5.1 with the 5-step operator scenario + DB invariants
  + curl recipe + Vitest pointer; new §1.5.2 covering Google/Apple
  parity (deferred client work flagged).

Verification (against live dev backend, before this commit):
- Vitest: 9/9 in auth.service.test.js; 49/51 overall (2 unrelated
  pre-existing failures in session-timer.service.test.js).
- Operator Node smoke: 14/14 in the §1.5.1 scenario; 11/11 in the
  Bearer-precedence cases.
- Real-device UI walkthrough on SM-A530F still pending — see resume
  memory `project_phase4_2_1_resume_test`.

Sister WIP bundled in migrate.js + customer.service.js: `usp_seen`
column + `markCustomerUspSeen` helper (Phase 4 USP one-time gate, was
already uncommitted in the working tree).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-13 23:57:53 +08:00
b59c66f7df Consolidate testing checklist into phase3.4-testing.md
Replaces phase3.3-testing.md. New doc covers:
- Part 1: Phase 3.4 self-managed auth — backend curl matrix, CC UI
  (cookie refresh + bridge), mitra_app + client_app (anonymous →
  upgrade, OTP stub codes, social behind flag), cross-app WS handshake
- Parts 2-4: Phase 3.3 topic sensitivity + 3.2 overlay/E2E/iOS + 3/3.1
  session lifecycle / chat mechanics / navigation — verbatim carry-over
- Part 5: Cross-cutting regression after 3.4 merge, platform coverage,
  security/negative (JWT leak, refresh rotation, cookie flags), and
  Known Blockers / Deferred updated for 3.4 reality (Valkey revocation,
  merge-on-link, firebase_uid drop, real Fazpass, social creds, Apple
  Dev prereqs, JWT rotation procedure)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-24 16:14:46 +08:00